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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

VIRGINIA REESP
Plaintiff & Respondent
-vs-

CASE No. 8619

)
GEORGE ARCHIBALD

)
Defendant & Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Respondent agrees with Appellant's statement of facts as set forth.
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II.
RESPONDENTtS ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S
Point ( 1 )
The evidence is clear that the son was in
an automobile accident; That he was taken to
Madison Memorial Hospital. (Appellant's
Statement of Facts. )
It is clear that he was hospitalized
there from November 18, 1954 to February 25,
1955. ( Exhibit P-1 and Plaintiff's interrogatory No. IV., defendant's Answer No. 4.)
Examination of Exhibit P-1, should demonstrate to this Court that the trial Court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that the hospita1 care was requisite for the health and wellbeing of the child. Examination of Exhibit P-1
reveals:

. . .
......

"1/13/55 . . .
"1/16/55
"1/14/55
II 11/19/54 • • o . •
"1/14/55 ......
"1/19/55 .••...

......

$20. 00
$10. 00
$55. 00
$22.50
$18.00
$ 8.00

......
•••••

0

. .....

......
......
••••

0

0

Blood
Blood
Surgery
Surgery
Cast
Cast,

and there are many charges for X=Rays and
dressings.
It is submitted that all of the foregoing
adequately demonstrates that the child needed
the care he received. As a matter of law, the
foregoing at least shifts the burden of going
forward with the evidence to defendant to support his claim that said treatment was not
necessary, and it is clear that Defendant2
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Respondent did not so go forward.
As to Appellant 1 s contention that there
was no showing that no part of the hospital bill
was paid and therefore, Defendant-Appellant
should not have to pay it 9 it is respectfully
urged as elemental that the defense of payment is an affirmative one.
Defendant admits he paid nothing. See
Page 4 of Appellant's brief: "Appellant does
not here contend that he had paid on the
account o o o "
That is all Plaintiff ever alleged
claiming the full amount due from Defendant.
Plaintiff claimed the account was all due from
Defendant and Exhibit P-1 shows it all due.
If Defendant claims payment on account by
someone else~ it is his burden to show payment by an affirmative allegation and prooL
There is no such affirmative defense pleaded.
Rule 8 (c), U.R. Co Po provides that
payment as a defense must be affirmatively
pleaded.
Plaintiff alleged Defendant didn't pay.
Defendant admits he didn't pay. If he claims
someone else paid, he must allege and prove
it. Defendant-Appellant did neither.

III.
RESPONDENT 'S- ANSWER TO .APPELLANT'S
POINTS (2}, (3 )y and (4}o
The questions as to reasonableness of
treatment have been discussed by Respondent
3
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in its Paragraph 11, hereof, and it is suggested
that Appellant's approach to that problem is
one borne of desperation, with an abdication of
decency in that it is obvious from Exhibit P -1
that Appellant's son was seriously and critically
injured, not taking into consideration that the
father had personal knowledge of that because
of his visit to the hospital. See Transcript 9
Page 4, Line 24 9 et seq.
The next point for consideration would be
this precept:
IS A FATHER RELIEVED OF HIS DUTY
TO SUPPORT HIS MINOR NATURAL
CHILD MERELY BECAUSE A DIVORCE
DECREE AWARDING CUSTODY. TO HIS
WIFE IS SILENT AS TO PROVISIONS
FOR SUPPORT OF THE MINOR CHILD?
Respondent claims that the jurisdictions
answering the above query in the affirmative
are in the minority.
Respondent claims that reason and human=
ity demand that such question be answered
against Defendant -Appellant.
At 15, A. L. R. 569, this language is
found:
"II.

MAJORITY RULE
(a) Rule Stated"

"The rule supported by the weight of
authority is that a father is not released from
his obligation to support or contribute to the
support of his infant children by reason of the
fact that the mother has been granted an absolute decree of divorce from him, and has been
4
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awarded the custody of the children by a decree
making no provision for their maintenance."
There follows this statement a great number of cases 9 supra.
At 159 ALR9 574, it is stated that the minority doctrine appears to be the law in California,
but that such result is a creature of statute, the
Court in the case of Selfridge-vs<~Paxton, 145
Cal. 713; 79 Pac. 427, saying:
"Whatever may be thought as to how
the law should be on this subject, we
must take it to be as written in the
Code."
There is no statute in Utah or Idaho thus
exonerating a father from supporting his minor
children, and certainly no precept permitting
a father to refuse to pay for medical attention
and care that undoubtedly was not only reasonable9 but probably saved the child's life.
The Annotation in 15, A. L. R., 574 is
further supplemented at 81 A. L. R. , 888,
wherein is contained a great number of more
recent cases adhering to the so-called major=
ity rule 9 in support of Plaintiff-Respondent's
position.
The precise question above referred to
has not subsequently been Annotated in A. L. R.
However, at 7 A. L. R. 2nd. 491, the position of
plaintiff=respondent is again stated as being
the rule of "weight of authority. ''
The case of Dodge -vs -Keller, cited by
Appellant at Page 8 of its brief 9 Annotated at
7 A. L. R. 2nd. 494, stands for the proposi-

5
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tion that a decree providing for stated support
payments puts a ceiling on or limits a father's
liability for s·upport.
The Dodge case furnishes no precedent
to support Appellant's theory.
Appellant at Page 8 of his brief pre=
sents views from one of the jurisdictions adhering to the so-called "minority ru1e." See
15, A. L. R. 573, and 81 A. L. R. 894, wherein
it is announced in both volumes that New York
follows the minority rule.
The same minority views are represented by Judson-vs=Judson 9 171 Mich. 195;
137 N. W. 103; and Burritt-vs-Burritt, 29
Barb. N.Y. 124, both being cited at Page 6
of Appellant's brief.
ARGUMENT
It is submitted that Appellant's arguments upon reasonable necessity of services
rendered is specious, if not unmoral, in
view of item designations listed in Exhibit
P-1.
Further Exhibit P -1, at the least,
shifts the burden of going forward with the
evidence to Appellant, who has not overcome
the prima facie case thus presented by Respondent.
The inference that there was payment
on the account should not be considered because Appellant admits he didn't pay it, as
Respondent alleged, and the affirmative de-

6
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fense of payment as required by our Rules was
not pleaded.
CONCLUSION
Appellant should be required to furnish
the necessaries received by his minor child 9
such requirement, in kind or in money being
recognized in all societies since time immemorial.
The decision of the trial Court should be
sustained 9 aligning Utah with the majority of
jurisdictions requiring a father to care for his
children even if a decree of divorce happens
to be silent pertaining thereto, which omissions
could possibly be results of ~hreats or inept
counsel.
Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE E. BRIDWELL
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent
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Attorneys for Appellant · ~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

